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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, and STATE OF 
UTAH, by and through JOHN W. 
ROLLY, Director, Utah State 
.Trade Commission, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
I.M.C. MINT CORPORATION, 
ROBERT GRABOR, GEORGE E. 
TWIBEY, et al. , 
Defendant. 
Case No. 16555 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This a review of a decision of the Third District Court 
wherein the court denied the state of Utah's claim for priority 
payment toward the sales and withholding tax debts of the de-
fendant from the assets held by the receiver. 
DISPOSITION IN LOtVER COURT 
The above captioned case was commenced when the de-
fendant I.M.C. Corporation was ordered into receivership by the 
Third District Court. The Tax Commission timely filed its 
claim of a preferred debt for sales and withholding taxes with 
the receiver. Formal objection to the state of Utah's claim of 
priority over general unsecured creditors was accomplished by 
the filing of a pleading to that effect. An informal hearing 
before the Honorable James S. Sawaya was held on the 15th day 
of March, 1979. Memoranda of Law were filed by counsel for the 
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receiver and the State Tax Commission. After due consideration 
the district court sustained the receiver's objection to the 
priority claims of the Utah State Tax Commission. This appeal 
. is from that particular order only. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Third District Court's I 
determination and a ruling that the state's claims for sales and 
withholding taxes be declared superior to those claims of general 
unsecured creditors. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
An informal hearing was held before the Honorable James 
S. Sawaya on the 15th day of March, 1979, for the purpose of 
hearing the receivers objection to the claims of the Utah State 
Tax Commission for unpaid sales and withholding taxes. (R. 485·n 
Brief arguments were heard and the Judge granted the request 
of the tax commission's counsel for leave to file a written 
memorandum of law on the issues involved with the state's claim 
for priority over general,unsecured creditors. Memoranda were 
filed by both parties. (R. 455-484). An order was issued sus-
taining the receiver's objections. (R. 485). 
The sales and withholding tax amounts arose in the 
following context. Defendant, I.H.C. Mint was found to be con· 
ducting business in Utah which was creating sales transactions 
which are the proper subject of the Utah sales tax. The tax 
commission contacted the corporation by making a request for 
audit arrangements and an application for a sales tax license. 
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Through various acts of the defendant, the audit arrangements 
were not made,thereby preventing the tax commission from com-
pleting the audits for sales taxes until June 20, 1974. In due 
.course, the audit was sent to the defendant-taxpayer on June 25, 
1974. In the meantime, a receiver was appointed by Judge James 
s. Sawaya on June 21, 1974. (R. 12-13). As the receiver had 
not yet notified the creditors, thereby putting the'commission 
on notice of the receivership, the tax commission continued in 
its normal procedure by mailing a notice of intent to file a 
tax warrant dated September 11, 1974. 
This dispute has arisen as the result of the receiver-
ship being established after the deficiency assessment but before 
the state filed warrants. The receiver asserts that the failure 
to file warrants prior to the court ordered receivership leaves 
the state without a tax lien and thus without a preference or 
priority over general, unsecured creditors. The tax commission 
asserts that the state has a lien for sales and withholding 
taxes independent of the warrant process. 
POINT I. 
THE GENERAL CREDITORS OF I.M.C. MINT 
SHOULD TAKE SECOND POSITION BEHIND 
THE CLAIM FOR TAXES AS UTAH IS FIRMLY 
COMMITTED TO THE RULE THAT TAXES FOR 
GENERAL GOVERNMENTAL PURPOSES ARE 
PARAMOUNT TO ALL OTHER DEMANDS AGAINST 
THE TAXPAYER. 
At this point in time in the receivership proceeding, 
all that remains to be decided is whether the state's claims for 
sales and withholding taxes are to be given priority over the 
claims of general, unsecured creditors. 
-3-
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This court has repeatedly held fast to the basic rule of 
tax law that "taxes for general governmental purposes, lawfully 
imposed by the state, are paramount to all other demands against 
the taxpayer, although the statute imposing the tax does not ex-
pres sly declare such priority." Hanson v. Burris, 86 Utah 424, 
46 P.2d 400 (1935) ,affinred in Ingrahamv. Hanson., 297 u.s. 378 (1936) 
See also: Robinson v. Hanson, 75 Utah 30, 282 P. 782 (1929); ~ 
Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Black, 67 Utah 268, 247 P. 486 (1926). 
The U.S. Supreme Court applied this basic principle to 
the receivership setting. In Marshall v. New York, 254 u.s. 380 
(1920) the Court decided the exact issue involved in the present 
case - whether the state "has priority in payment our of general 
assets of the debtor over other creditors whose claims are not 
secured by act of the parties nor accorded a preference, by 
reason of their nature, by the state legislature or otherwise." 
Id. at 382. The Court noted the common law of England as incocyc 
ated by state constitution which established the sovereigns 
priority for payment. Such priority being effective whether the: 
property was in the hands of the debtor or in custodia legis. 
The Court applied this rule to find the receiver acted improper!); 
in denying the states claim which had not become a lien under 
the laws of New York at the time of the receivership. Of speciai 
relevance was the C.ourt 1 s observance that the state 1 s tax 
have been collectable by warrant had the receiver not been 
would 1 
I 
I 
appointed. The Court then stated: "Since the prerogative right o:l 
the State could not be enforced by levy and seizure, an applica·: 
tion to the court for payment of the debt due was the appropriat·; 
! 
-4-
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remedy." Id. at 385. In short, the court ordered the receiver 
to pay the state's claim for taxes notwithstanding the fact that 
the claim had not risen to the level of a lien. 
As additional support for the proposition that this court 
should order the receiver to pay the taxes in the instant case, 
the appellant refers the court to Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co., 
Receiver, 286 U.S. 334 (1932). The case will be discussed in more 
detaiL infra, but basically it stands for the proposition that the 
creation of a receivership should not be allowed to defeat a 
state's claim for taxes accruing before or during a receivership. 
As the instant case does not involve a dispute between 
the state and creditors who can point to any preference or 
priority which attaches to their claim, the statement of sub-
stantive law quoted above dictates that the state's tax claims 
be satisfied prior to any disbursement to general creditors. 
This must follow unless the creditors can point to any law to 
the contrary which seeks to alter this established principle of 
tax law. The Robinson v. Hanson court explicitly so stated when 
it pronounced: 
[T]he priority of the sovereign 
claims of the state will not be de-
preciated or denied without warrant 
from the Legislature in clear and un-
mistakeable terms; .... 282 P. at 784 
(emphasis added). 
The receiver points to Rule 66(f) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure as modification of the rule of inherent super-
iority. Appellant asserts that Rule 66(f) is only an attempt to 
implement the rule of state superiority and any construction to 
the contrary is without proper foundation in the law. 
In situations where sufficient liquid assets are available 
-5-
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to pay taxes, Rule 66(f) provides: 
Before any personal property corning 
into the hands of a receiver may be sold, 
transferred or hypothecated, such receiver 
shall pay and discharge any and all taxes 
constituting a lien thereon legally levied 
by any taxing unit of the state •••• 
The receiver argued below that 66 {f)'s language, "taxes 
constituting a lien~' when coupled with the statement made in 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wagstaff, 22Utah 2d 177, 450 P.2d 100 
(1969)~ that the state's lien "for delinquent withholding taxes 
begins to run at the time notice thereof is given by filing Ue 
warrant" mandated that only taxes accompanied by warrants were 
preferred under Rule 66 (f). The appellant maintains that it was 
error for the lower court to have adopted this view of the rule 
for three reasons. 
First, by their own terms, Utah Rules of Civil Procedunl 
are procedural only. Utah R. Civ. P. l(a) reads: 
(a) Scope of Rules: These rules 
shall govern the procedure in the Supreme 
Court, the district courts, city courts, 
and justice courts of the State of Utah, 
in all actions, suits and proceedings of 
a civil nature, whether cognizable at law 
or in equity .... (emphasis added). 
These rules were promulgated pursuant to authority grant· 
ed by Utah Code Ann. §72-2-4 which reads: 
The Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah has power to prescribe, alter, and 
revise, by rules, for all courts of the 
State of Utah, the forms of process, writs, 
pleadings and motions and the practice and 
1. The Phillips decision will be discussed at some length infro, 
-6-
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procedure in all civil and criminal 
actions and proceedings, .. ~ . Such 
rules may not abridge, enlarge, or 
modif~ the substantive rights of any 
litigant. (emphasis added). 
It seems clear that these Rules are promulgated to govern 
judicial procedure and are not intended to contravene or create 
any substantive law governing the people of the state of Utah.2 
In fact, the appellant can imagine no reason why the 
court would have desired to cut off the rights of the state to 
claim priority for taxes in a receivership setting. This court 
upheld the taxes on a receivership while it operated a business 3 
and in doing so fell in line with the majority position. 4 In the 
absence of the receivership the state would have taken over 
general creditors, so this author wonders why the court would 
believe the state should not take a priority posture simply be-
cause no lien had arisen as of the time the receiver was appointed. 
Secondly, even if Rule 66(f) was intended to do more than 
establish procedural guidelines in a receivership proceeding it 
could not constitutionally operate so as to change the substan-
tive law applicable to the payment of debts due the state of Utah. 
utah const. art. v, section 1 mandates this when it reads: 
The powers of the government of the 
State of utah shall be divided into three 
distinct departments, the Legislative, the 
Executive, and the Judicial; and no person 
2. For case authority addressing this issue see generally Strahan 
v. Strahan, 400 P.2d 542 (Wyo. 1965); Phoenix of Hartford v. 
Harmony Restaurant, 560 P.2d 441 (Ariz. App. 1977). 
3. Archer v. Arnovitz, 92 Utah 459, 70 P.2d 462 (1937). 
4. See 66 Am. Jur. 2d Receivers §423. 
-7-
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charged with the exercise of powers 
properly belonging to one of these 
departments shall exercise any func-
tions appertaining to either of the 
others, except in the cases herein 
expressly directed or permitted. 
Appellant submits that the creation of liens and the 
effect to be given thereto is a legislative function. See ~· 
Marion, 159 Ohio St. 290, 112 N.E. 2d 32, 36 (1953); State v. 
Bi-Lo Foods, Inc., 383 P.2d 910 (Wash. 1963). To place a con-
struction of Rule 66(f) so as to provide a modification of the 
principle of law that the state's debts are inherently superior 
to general, private obligations would be unconstitutional. As 
there are other constructions of the Rule which are constitution 
the unconstitutional construction should be discarded. 
Lastly, the Utah Supreme Court emphatically stated that 
without a clear and unmistakable mandate from the 
to the contrary, the state's general taxes would be 
other claims. Robinson v. Hanson, 282 P. at 784. 
legislature I 
preferred ove·l 
That 66 (f) i: 
not such a clear and unmistakable mandate becomes clear by re-i 
ferring to the words of the rule. If no sufficient liquid asse: 
are available to the receiver to satisfy the taxes constituting 
a lien on personal property, the court may authorize a sale of 
the property prior to a payment of such taxes. However, 11 irnrned: 
ately upon receipt of the consideration for such sale .. -~ 
receiver shall pay and discharge all such liens, taxes, and 
within ten days thereafter shall file. . . evidence showing fuL 
payment and discharge of all such taxes. 11 (emphasis added). 
-8-
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The appellant submits that the receiver's duty to "pay 
and discharge all such liens, taxes" under Rule 66(f) is simply 
language which allows the receiver to comply with the law in 
ensuring that the state is satisfied before the assets of the 
business are distributed to the public. 
The logic behind the general recognition of the unique 
nature of a debt owned the state is apparent when one closely 
examines the taxes. With both taxes involved in this dispute 
the taxpayers on whom they fall have already paid the tax. In 
the instant case, the taxpayers remitted the sales tax to the 
defendant, I.M.C. Mint for transmission to the state. Similarly, 
I.M.C. Mint withheld projected income tax amounts from money owed 
its employees and in so withholding, became a trustee for the 
State of Utah. See express language to this effect in Utah Code 
Ann. §59-l4A-44(e). Thus, the taxes the state seeks in this 
case are inherently different from and are of a higher nature 
than general and unsecured claims. 
In summary, it is the state's contention that it's tax 
claims are inherently superior to the claims of unsecured, general 
creditors, that a receivership does not affect that superiority, 
and that Rule 66(f) does nothing more than ensure that these 
principles of law are uniformly carried out in all court-sanctioned 
receiverships in Utah. 
-9-
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POINT II. 
RULE 66(f) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE REQUIRES THE STATE'S CLAIMS 
FOR SALES AND WITHHOLDING TAXES BE 
PAID PRIOR TO CLAIMS OF GENERAL 
CREDITORS. 
Rule 66(f) reads in part as follows: 
Before any personal property may 
be sold, transferred or hypothecated, 
such receiver shall pay and discharge 
any and all taxes constituting a lien 
thereon, legally levied by any taxing 
unit of the state, .• 
In the present controversy there is no contention that 
the tax amounts were not properly levied. The only question 
remaining before invoking the provisions of Rule 66(f) is / 
whether the sales and withholding taxes,which are the subject of 
the state's claim,are liens. The Tax Commission submits that I 
Rule 66 (f) makes no mention of perfected liens, nor does it dis· i 
tinguish between perfected or unperfected lier.s. It simply stat<! 
that the receiver shall pay any and all taxes constituting a liet 
I 
The Commission maintains that the state did have a lien 
for each type of tax for the stated amounts at the time the order 
appointing a receiver was signed by the district court judge. A!! 
supported for this position the appellant directs attention to I 
Utah Code Ann. §59-14A-44 (e) which establishes a lien for withho:, 
ing taxes when it reads: "the State of Utah shall have a lien I 
to secure the payment of any amounts withheld and not remitted. 
upon all of the assets of the employer and all property. . .whiC' 
said lien shall be prior to any lien of any kind whatsoever in· 
including existing liens for taxes." (emphasis added). 
-10-
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The Commission maintains that the above provision 
establishes a lien as a matter of law at the moment in time when 
both of the following have occurred: 
(1) The income tax has been withheld from the employee's 
pay; and 
(2) when the amount withheld was not remitted to the 
tax commission as required by law. 
The Commission submits that Utah Code Ann. §59-15-10, 
created a lien for the sales tax amounts due when the defendant 
ceased doing business as a result of the appointment of a re-
ceiver. §59-15-10 reads: "The tax imposed by this Act [Emergency 
Revenue Act of 1933 or Sales Tax Act] shall be a lien upon the 
property of any wholesaler or retailer or proprietor who shall. 
quit business .... " (emphasis added). 
It should be noted that neither of these taxing provi-
sions is tied to the warrant statutes or procedures which may 
also impose a lien on the property of a delinquent taxpayer. A 
further observation is that these lien provisions do not mandate 
any "perfection" criteria or other requirements which the state 
must comply with prior to its being able to claim a lien against 
the delinquent taxpayer's property. The following discussion 
will amplify the state's contention that it has a lien for purposes 
of Rule 66 (f). 
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has had the 
opportunity to construe a statutory scheme similar to Utah's 
scheme in District of Columbia v. Hechinger Properties Co., 197 
A. 2d 157 (1964). Involved in Hechinger was the District of 
-11-
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Columbia's claim for sales and withholding taxes against funds 
held by a marshal for distribution to an attaching judgment 
creditor. The District's statutory scheme governing tax liens 
is analogous to Utah's tax lien statutes. D.C. Code 1961, 
§47-1586g(f) (2) provides that: 
The District of Columbia shall have a 
lien upon all the property of any employer 
who fails to withhold or pay over to the 
collector sums required to be withheld under 
this section. If the employer withholds but 
fails to pay over the amounts withheld to 
the collector, the lien shall accrue on the 
date the amounts were withheld. If the 
employer fails to withhold, the lien shall 
accrue on the date the amounts were required 
to be withheld. 
In substance, this above-quoted provision is identical 
f to Utah Code Ann. (1953) (hereafter U.C.A.) §59-14A-44 (e) supra.! 
Under D.C. Code §47-1586g(f) (2), the lien accrues on thej 
I dates the amounts were withheld. Under §59-14A-44, the lien 
arises when the amounts withheld are not remitted pursuant to 
the statutory procedure. 
The Hechinger case became even more relevant when it is 
noted that the District of Columbia has a similar statute to 
Utah's various warrant statutes. D.C. Code 1961, §47-312 pro-
vides that when a person fails to remit the taxes due the dis-
trict, the taxes may be collected in the manner prescribed in 
§47-1406, which reads in part: 
... [T) he collector of taxes, . . . may file 
a certificate of such delinquent personal 
tax with the clerk of the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia, 
which certificate from the date of its 
filing shall have the force and effect, as 
against the delinquent person named in such 
certificate of the lien created by a judg-
ment granted by said court . . . . 
-12-
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Again,the Utah counterpart to the above provision, 
u.c.A. §59-14A-79, provides substantially the same collection 
remedy as does the District's statutes. Subparagraph (c) of 
§59-14A-79 provides that "the tax commission may issue a warrant 
. directed to the sheriff • . commanding him to levy upon 
and sell such person's real and personal property .• " Sub-
paragraph (d) continues by providing that the sheriff shall file 
a copy of the warrant with the clerk of the district court which 
operates to create "a binding lien upon the real, personal and 
other property of the taxpayer to the same extent as other judg-
ments duly docketed in the office of such clerk." Subparagraph 
(e) states that once the warrant is filed, the tax commission 
shall "be deemed to have obtained judgment against the taxpayer." 
Having established the similarity of the two governments' 
tax statutes, it is important to note how the Hechinger court 
resolved the District's claims for taxes. In that case, the 
trial court had held that since the District had not filed its 
certificate prior to the attachment proceedings, its claim to 
taxes was subordinate to that of the attaching creditor. In 
holding in favor of the District, in its claim for priority for 
withholding taxes, the court stated: 
A lien created by statute exists indepen-
dently of the various means of enforcement 
which the statute permits. If the lien is 
given by the statute, further proceedings are 
not necessary to fix the status of the property. 
In our case a lien commenced at the time 
the income was w1thheld, or on the date it should 
have been withheld. It was oerfected, it was 
choate, at these times and no further action 
was necessary to perfect it. It has long 
been regarded as a universal principle that a 
prior lien gives a prior legal right which is 
entitled to prior satisfaction out of the 
subject it binds . . (citations omitted). 
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The construction given 47-1586g(f) (2) 
by the trial court must be tested against 
the intent and purpose of Congress. The 
trial court held that the District has no lien 
until it records a withholding tax lien in the 
United States District Court. But Section 
47-312, by itself, with no reliance upon any 
other statute, gives the District the right 
to acquire a lien for taxes in the same 
manner that liens for personal property taxes 
are acquired, i.e., by filing a certificate 
of delinquent taxes with the United States 
District Court, pursuant to the authority of 
Section 47-1406 of the Code. If we uphold 
the trial court's interpretation, Section 
47-1586g(f) (2) is meaningless. We do not 
believe Congress intended to enact a nullity 
~n adopt~ng Sect~on 47-1586g(f) (2). We think 
that ~ts pur ose was clear -- to g~ve the 
D~str~ct a l~en w ~ch ar~ses and ex~sts on 
the date income taxes are withheld or are re-
quired to be w~thheld b~ the employer and has 
priority over other cla~ms. Id. at 160 
(emphasis added) . 
The District of Columbia Court's unwillingness to render 
a piece of legislation meaningless is a well accepted judicial 
attitude founded on the rule of statutory construction that the 
legislature intends that all its enactments should be given 
effect. 5 Moreover, all statutes should be so construed, if 
possible, by a fair and reasonable interpretation, as to give 
full force and effect to each and all of them. 6 Furthermore, 
it is not to be assumed that one or the other of related statute 
is meaningless; rather, such statutes will be so construed as 
to give each a field of operation. 7 
This argument is especially applicable in light of 
legislative action taken after a Utah Supreme Court case which 
construed the predecessor to u.C.A. §59-14A-44(e), U.C.A. 
5. 73 Arn.Jur.2d Statutes §253 and cases cited therein. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
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§59-14-79(3) (e). In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wagstaff, 450 
P.2d 100 (Utah 1969), the court declared that §59-14-79(3) (e) 
did not give the State a lien priority over prior, existing 
liens and that the state's lien for taxes begins to run at 
the time notice thereof is given by filing the warrant. Four 
years later the Utah Legislature enacted identical language to 
§59-14-71(3) (e) in the §59-14A-44(e). In the same act (Individual 
Income Tax Act of 1973), the legislature enacted §59-14A-79, the 
warrant statute governing withholding taxes. 
It would seem odd indeed for the Utah Legislature to 
have revamped the State's entire income tax scheme in 1973 and 
include §59-14A-44(e) and §59-14A-79(d) if it did not intend 
for both lien statutes to have effect. The fact that this 
legislature used the exact language of §59-14-71(3) {e) in enact-
ing §59-14A-44(e) four years after Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Wagstaff, supra, reemphasizes their desire to give priority 
treatment to tax liens over liens created by private parties to 
the extent allowed by law. (For discussion of what is allowed 
under the Phillips case see Point IV, infra.) 
The Commission submits that just as the Hechinger court 
held that the District of Columbia'a recording-to-create-a-lien 
statutes, §47-312 and 47-1406, were independent of any other 
statutes, so are Utah's warrant statutes independent of lien 
provisions found in U.C.A. §§59-14A-44(e) and 59-15-10. 
Having disposed of the withholding tax dispute, the 
Hechinger court considered the District's claim for sales taxes. 
The private creditor again argued that the District's failure to 
file a certificate of delinquent taxes relegated its claim 
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inferior to the creditor's claim. In holding that the recording. 
type statute and the lien-arising-as-a-matter-of-law statute 
were independent provisions, the court noted: 
we construe §47-2610 as a mere per-
missive way ("may" be collected) in which 
the District of Columbia can give notice, if 
it desires, to creditors or potential creditors 
of its prior claims. 197 A.2d at 161. 
Just as the D.C. Code §47-2610, read "may be collected," U.C.A. 
§59-14A-79(c), states that the "tax commission may issue a 
warrant." 
To adopt the interpretation of Utah's lien statutes that 1 
the court did in Phillips, supra, is to render §59-14A-44(e) 
meaningless, an act this court should seek to avoid. 
The Commission urges this court to adopt the position 
of the highest Court of the District of Columbia. This is done 
in an effort to preserve that generally accepted proposition that 
the maintenance of all the vital governmental services depends 
upon the raising of the necessary revenue to fund the same. 
See Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Black, supra, at 488; Schlothan 
v. Territory of Alaska, 276 F.2d 806 (1960). 
The receiver attempted to dismiss the helpfulness of 
the Hechinger case by observing that a District statute gave 
taxes priority treatment in a receivership setting irrespective 
of whether they constitute liens. This observation is irrelevant 
because an undisturbed trial court ruling found the dispute 
was outside the scope of the priority statute, thereby rendering 
the appellate court's construction of the lien statutes very 
much in point. The appellant recognizes that the Hechinger 
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decision cannot be totally consonant with the Phillips Petroleum 
co. v. Wagstaff, supra, but the appellant asserts that Hechinger 
is a better reasoned case when applied to the facts of the instant 
controversy where it is only important to decide if the state has 
a lien for purposes of Rule 66(f). For an extensive discussion 
of Phillips decision see Points III and IV, infra. 
The interpretation of the Utah lien statutes proffered 
by the Commissio~ is strengthened by referring to two rules of 
general lien law stated below. In Lannan v. Waltenspiel,45 Utah 564 
147 P. 908, 909 (1915), the court stated that "Statutes giving 
a lien are remedial and therefore to be liberally construed, and 
so construed as to accomplish the legislative purpose " (emphasis 
added). To this same effect,see Kerr-McGee Oil Industries v. 
W.J. McGary, 361 P.2d 734, 89 Ariz. 307 (1961): Dewar v. Hagans, 
146 P.2d 208, 61 Ariz. 207 (1944): Lewis v. Midway Lumber, Inc., 
561 P.2d 750, 114 Ariz. 426 (1977); Peterson-Donnelly Engineers & 
Contractors Corp. v. First National Bank of Arizona, Phoeni~ 408 
P.2d 841, 2 Ariz. App. 321 (1966): International Harvester Credit 
Corp. v. Goodrich, 350 U.S. 537, 544 (1956). 
The other rule the Commission cites for support was enunci-
ated in Dutt v. Marion Air Conditioning Sales, 112 N.E. 2d 32, 36 
(Ohio 1953),where the court said: "[T]he question, whether a 
statutory lien on property generally sould prevail over a speci-
fic lien on particular personal property, is ordinarily a legis-
lative and not a judicial question." 
The Commission maintains that U.C.A. §§59-14A-44(e) and 
59-15-10 are indicative of a legislative intent to give priority 
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to the tax claims of the state. The Commission further asserts 
that Rule 66{f) was set up to implement the state's preference 
over other creditors and not as a technicality to serve as a 
roadblock or divest the state of priority it would have other-
wise had in the absence of the receivership. As to this latter 
point it sould be observed that the U.S. Supreme Court has 
recognized that at times a receivership goes beyond its purpose 
of conservation of assets and liquidation of a business when 
it stated: 
Receiverships for conservation have 
at times a legitimate function, but they 
are to be watched with jealous eyes lest 
their function be perverted. . To 
protect through a receiver the enjoyment 
of the corporate privilege and then to 
use the appointment as a barrier to the 
collection of the tax that should accompany 
enjoyment would be an injustice to the 
State and a reproach to equity. Michigan 
v. Michigan Trust Co., Receiver, 286 U.S. 
334, 345-346 {1932)B(emphasis added). 
This statement becomes very relevant in light of the 
fact that the Michigan court ordered the receiver to pay the 
franchise tax which had accrued the year prior to the establis~ 
ment of the receivership. To this effect the court stated: 
8 For a statement in a similar vein, see State v. Bradley, 207& 
677, 93 So. 595,596 (1922) where the court stated: "It is th 
manifest duty of a receiver of an existing domestic corporatio: 
to satisfy out of the funds in the receiver's hands all valid tal 
or governmental impositions in that nature imposed by the 
corporation's creator that would have been demandable of the 
corporation had the receivership not been created." 
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Taxes owing to the Government, whether 
due at the beginning of a receivership or 
subsequently accruing, are the erice that 
business has to pay for protect~on and 
security." citing Coy v. Title Guarantee & 
Trust Co., 220 Fed. 9~ 92, 286 u.s. at 344 
(emphasis added) 
The Commission merely urges this court to follow the 
intent of the legislature in providing for the payment of debts 
due the state before private debts are paid. 
POINT III. 
PUBLIC POLICY DICTATES THAT THE 
STATE'S CLAIM FOR WITHHOLDING 
TAXES BE SUPERIOR TO ALL LIENS 
Appellant maintains that cases upholding statutes which 
grant state tax claims priority over other obligations are well 
reasoned in light of the nature of the obligations involved. 
The Utah decisions which recite the state's inherent claim for 
priority over general obligations have stated their reasons for 
doing so. In Robinson v. Hanson, 75 Utah 30, 282 P. 782, 784 
(1929) the court stated: 
The first and paramount necessity 
for social order, personal liberty, and 
private property is the maintenance of 
civil government; and government cannot 
exist without revenues. The necessity 
and importance of preferring the lien 
for general taxes over other claims are 
so impelling that the priority of the 
sovereign claims of the state will not 
be depreciated or denied without warrant 
from the Legislature in clear and un-
mistakable terms. 
In Union Cent. Life v. Black, 67 Utah 268, 247 P. 486, 
488 (1926) the court noted: 
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It has been held frequently that a tax 
lawfully imposed by the state on its citizens 
is not an ordinary debt, but is an obligation 
which by its very nature should be regarded 
as paramount to all other demands against 
the taxpayer • . • Such decisions proceed 
on the theory that the maintenance of good 
government and the public welfare are to 
such an extent dependent upon the prompt 
collection of taxes that demands of that 
nature should take precedence of all claims 
founded upon pr~vate contracts." 
(emphas~s added) . 
The need for these revenues is never more apparent than 
it is right now when the lack of state revenue has caused a stat1 
reduction in all budgets. This has had the direct impact of 
cutting off government service in the welfare area and in variou; 
service arms of the government. 
To follow the Phillips decision and ignore the legisla-
tive mandate to prefer withholding tax claims over prior secured 
creditors notwithstanding a notice giving warrant is to deal ~e 
state treasury a double blow. Not only has the state been de-
pri ved of revenue it was relying upon to come from the default-
ing employer to fund necessary services, but in many instances t: 
state must deplete other needed and appropriated funds. This 
occurs when the employee of the defaulting employer files for ani 
receives his or her income tax refund. It is obvious that the 
legislature singled out the withholding tax as the only tax 
needing special procedures to guarantee vital revenue at the 
expense of prior lien holders - even tax-lien holders. 
In Union Cent. Life v. Black, supra, this court recogn-
ized that circumstances surrounding the public debt will save a 
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collection procedure from constitutional attack when it cited 
another court decision as follows: 
The fact has also been recognized 
from time immemorial that every sover-
eignty ought to be armed with the re-
quisite power to enforce the collection 
of taxes without fail, and to compel 
the prompt payment of whatever imposts 
it sees fit to levy for its own support. 
In view of that necessity it has been a 
common practice to provide summary re-
medies for enforcing such demands, which 
have been upheld by the courts whenever 
assailed, although it is quite probable 
that some of the remedies so provided 
could not have been sustained as afford-
ing due process of law, if the proceed-
ings had related to the collection of 
purely private debts. 247 P. at 488 
(emphasis added). 
Appellant asserts that the state's need for revenue and 
the legislature's recognition of that outweighs the notice con-
siderations stated in the Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wagstaff 
decision. To the extent that the court finds the Phillips 
decision dispositive of this case, the appellant asks this court 
to overrule that decision. The legislative decision to limit 
this powerful collection tool to withholding taxes was a prudent 
use of its authority which was founded on a recognition of the 
peculiar problems attendant to that tax. 
As to the notice issue, several courts have con-
sidered the require1nents of sufficient notice when a state tax 
has been involved. At issue in Schlothan v. Territory of Alaska, 
276 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1960),was the priority of liens between a 
mortgagee and the Territory of Alaska. As in Phillips, the 
mortgagee had a recorded 1nortgage predating any recorded lien 
for taxes due the Territory of Alaska. The territory had a 
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statute which provided that the lien for taxes was "prior, 
paramount and superior to all other liens, mortgages • "1 
(Compare with Utah Code Ann. §59-14A-44(e). The court 
rejected the mortga9ee's constitutional due process at~ack 
when it held that the mortgagee is "chargeable with know-
ing of the lien provisions of chapter 82. Hence, .•. [the 
mortgagee] had constructive notice that when Einstoss [the mortg· 
I 
agor and defaulting taxpayer] acquired title to her property a ! 
paramount inchoate lien would immediately attach. This 
notice was sufficient to meet the requirements of due process." 
I~ at 811. The Schlothan court cited as support, International 
Harvester Credit Corp. v. Goodrich, 350 U.S. 537, 76 S. Ct. 621 
100 L.Ed. 681 (1956), wherein the court upheld a New York State 
Highway tax. The New York statute imposed a lien for highway 
use taxes which was paramount to all prior liens or encumbrances 
of any character. In upholding the state's priority, the court 
rejected a due process attack,noting that the statute imposing 
the lien gave ample notice of the tax and the provisions of its 
collections. 350U.S. at 543-44. For further discussion in the 
constitutional area, see Terri tory of Alaska v. Craig Enterprises, 
355 P. 2d 397 (Alaska 1960), where the court discusses many other 
cases which have considered the notice issue surrounding so-
called "secret" liens of states for taxes. Of_ special relevance 
to the case at hand was the Craig Enterprises case where 
the court upheld the state's statute providinq priority 
treatment for state tax claims. The court applied a balancing 
standard in finding that such a statute did not overpass the 
bounds of reason. See 355 P.2d at 402. 
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For a recentcasewhere the court upheld the state's 
right to prefer public obligations over prior private debts, 
see Wasson v. Hogenson, 583 P.2d 914 (Colo. 1978). 
In summary, the appellant believes that the Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Wagstaff decision is not controlling of the 
instant case and is distinguishable therefrom. 9 Even if it 
were controlling, it should be overruled. 10 
9. For further discussion of this position see Point IV, infra. 
10. For further discussion of this position see Point II, supra. 
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POINT IV. 
THE LOWER COURTS RELIANCE ON THE 
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO. V. WAGSTAFF 
CASE WAS INAPPROPRIATE AS THE INSTANT 
CONTROVERSY INVOLVES DIFFERENT CONCEPTS 
THAN WERE THERE INVOLVED. 
Counsel for the receiver would urge this court to find 
that Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wagstaff, 22 Utah 2d 177, 450 
P.2d 100 (1969), is controlling in the matter at hand. The 
Phillips case involved a suit to foreclose a mortgage wherein 
the State of Utah asserted that its liens for delinquent with-
holding taxes were superior to the mortgage by reason of a 
statute stating that the lien of the State "shall be prior to 
any lien of any kind whatsoever." 
The court decided in favor of the mortgagee by holding 
that the State's lien for withholding taxes only begins to run 
at the time notice thereof is given by filing the warrant. The 
appellant submits that this holding simply reflects the court's 
recognition of, and strict adherence to, the system of recordation I 
I 
of all matters affecting real property. Practically speaking, I 
the court's holding directs the State to comply with the record-
ing and notice provisions of the recording statutes if it wishes 
to resort to the real property of the delinquent taxpayer in 
seeking satisfaction of the debt due the State. 
It is possible to reach this conclusion by referring 
the State's various lien statutes. In the statutes creating 
sales, use, income, franchise and privilege taxes, the 1 egislatu:l' 
established a procedure for lien creation. In each statute, 
I 
where the legislature expressly creates a lien upon real proper:\ 
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express direction is given to the Tax Commission to docket a 
warrant in the District Court. However, where no express mention 
of real property exists (U.C.A. §59-15-10 and S59-14A-44(e)), the 
legislature gives no directions at all concerning the docketing 
of a warrant. Appellant submits that this possibly demonstrates 
a legislative intent to subject the Tax Commission to the sac-
rosanct real property recording system before granting any 
priority to the State for taxes. The foregoing analysis also 
recognizes that no such complete and conclusive record exists 
in other property areas. 
Thus, as the State's current claim for taxes is made 
against assets for which there is no all encompassing system 
wherein claims can be established or protected, the reasoning 
behind the Phillips decision is simply inapplicable. Especially 
is this so in this case,where the creditors involved did not 
rely on any record in extending credit the way a secured party 
does. A general creditor may seek out a potential debtor's 
financial condition before extending credit, but he does not 
depend on a particular asset to have a fixed value which will 
be available to him,and no one else,if a default occurs and 
resort to the security is needed. 
The legislature's passage of statutes containing 
identical language as was construed in Phillips Petroleum v. 
Wagstaff four years subsequent to that decision, may be argued 
to be the recognition of this construction. 
The considerations involved in the Phillips case are 
absent from the present one and it should not be controlling 
in the instant controversy. 
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CONCLUSION 
The State's claims for sales and withholding taxes were 
appropriately made.· The fact that a receivership was ordered 
before the State could perfect and execute upon its liens shouU 
not operate to cut off the state's claims for taxes in favor of 
general, unsecured creditors. This is especially true in light 
of the fact that it was the debtor-taxpayers own actions of 
failing to file true and correct tax returns which prevented 
the State from perfecting its lien. 
The lower court erred in finding that a rule of civil 
procedure operated to divest the State of its inherently para-
mount claim for taxes, relegating it to the level of a general 
creditor. Appellant asks this court to order the receiver to 
pay all sales and withholding taxes prior to any payment to 
general, unsecured creditors. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
MARK K. BUCHI 
Assistant Attorney General 
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